history

What are the core causes and outcomes of the Great Depression?

The following essay attempts to analyse the causes and effects of the Great Depression. The essay will be split into two parts. The part Causes, will sketches the economic, political and international reasons for the Great Depression. Outcomes, will illustrate the drastic changes the Great Depression brought to both American society and the rest of the globe.

 

Causes

The Wall Street Crash and the Depression

In popular memory the Wall Street crash of 1929, played a large part in the Great Depression. This is a myth. The Wall Street crash of 1929 succeeded in creating a panic among investors and stock brokers, but its overall effect was not felt outside Wall Street until one year later. Neither did the laissez faire economy of the United States suffer immediately. When analysing the Market itself, this is understandable because it showed a quick recovery. Large losses for investors did not immediately become felt but in the process of two years. Harold Bierman comments on how the market lost 11.9% of its value in 1929, after gaining 37.9% in the previous year; however, this was not an unusual phenomenon.[1] America had gone through previous cycles, where the value of stock dropped substantially and had suffered depressions in 1873, 1884, 1893-95, 1907 and 1914. Thus, 1929 was, at first glance, not something out of the ordinary for investors. Many well known economists of the time such as John Maynard Keynes, expected the market to recover, and by 1930 the market had indeed recovered the majority of its losses. Therefore, it is a mistake to assume that the loss of value in the market after the Crash of 1929 was the overriding cause of the overall economic crises of the United States that became known as the ‘Great Depression’.

If the statistics of the stock market are analysed in proportion the population, the impact of the stock market is minimal and the loss in value cannot be assessed in terms of quantity. Though investors on the stock market did provide a firm basis for investors and traders, their activity cannot be demonstrated in proportion to investors in other institutions, such as commercial banks. The numbers of Americans who owned stock, is estimated to number from 500,000 to 750,000 which was only 3% of the United States population. Logistically, there was not a substantial enough number of investors to make a drastic influence to the pattern of consumerism, and the commercial sectors of the American Economy.[2] Even with disproportionate value in stock, the Stock Market’s effect on the economy falls to the actors of the American economy rather than the statistics, or the prices of stock themselves. Even when talking about the actors of the stock market crash various investors such as J.P. Morgan, had raised $20-30 Million to raise the value of stocks and this attempt was successful.[3] It was only when the Depression took hold in commercial banking did the bolstering of stock prices become inadequate. Therefore to calculate the causes of the depression, it is over-simplistic to simply suggest the financial state of the stock market played a domineering part. It is on this premise alone that the Wall Street Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression need to be separated.

Analysing the Wall Street Crash is also problematic as there is no underlining consensus as to why it happened. There are several arguable factors as to why this occurred and these are often debated. For example, Gene Smiley argues the Wall Street crash was due to the decrease in profit expectations, which eventually impacted Wall Street.[4] Other Historians such Hugh Brogan have simply argued that the Crash was caused by the selling of six million shares, which seemed to have changed hands overnight.[5] However, the points themselves are debatable and this must be seen in the wider context of United States society. For example, Robert Sobel explains that over-production of consumer goods had led to a decrease in the price of materials, and this led to stagnation in stock prices.[6] The fact that the causes for the Wall Street Crash are debatable, means that its responsibility for the Depression becomes increasingly ambiguous.

The separation between the Wall Street Crash and the Great Depression are also characterised by their popularized symbols. These play an integral part in understanding both events and how they came to be formed. The Wall Street Crash is characterised by a minority of investors who lost a large sum of money from over-speculation. However, the Great depression is characterised by a number of factors. It is often represented by mass unemployment, decadent forms of poverty; the never-ending employment search for 20 million American citizens; unstable commercial institutions and indecisive American policies.[7]

 

The actual causes of the Great Depression

Agriculture

The Great Depression can be viewed depending on the sector of the US economy. For agriculture, it is arguable that the depression arrived early and continued until the Second World War. During the Progressive Era from 1890 to 1920, agricultural education was increased which planned to expand methods that would increase the amount of agricultural food available on the American market. During the First World War, American agriculture had increased exponentially in order to feed The United States Army on the Western Front. By 1918, the number people who owned farms stood at 2,251 and a record high $1,600,000 was spent expanding agricultural holdings. [8]

After the War had finished, prosperity would cause severe financial strains. The large abundance of food being produced meant the price of wheat decreased, which lowered the amount of pay each farmer received. This led to overproduction which was also characterised by technological progression. During the First World War, famers were encouraged to mechanise their farming methods. However, the majority of these machines were out of their financial reach, which forced farmers to pay for new technology on credit with high interest rates. As a result, the new income and purchasing power of famers declined by 25%, and the total of farm products fell by half. As cereals were over-produced, the price of crops also fell by half. Since the average wage for farmers varied from $1000- $1500 per year, the most vulnerable farmers were not able to pay back their credit and farmer’s properties were closed. The situation was not helped by the introduction of prohibition which meant the amount of crops produced also decreased at alarming rates, because there was a large surplus of crops which was not being viably sold.[9] The pattern shows a credit bubble which finally burst and caused an alarming loss in finance. For farmers, this had been the short financial boom and continuing depression which was to last until the Second World War. It puts into perspective the term ‘Great Depression’ and how it should be used with caution, if historians are going to use it to symbolise a specific period of time in American History. This is important, especially when the population of American farmers was 33 million in 1929, at the height of the agricultural depression.[10]

 

The American Economy: Major Trends

The Great Depression as understood from 1930 onwards, can be understood from the dominant form of economics that emerge out of the 1920s, the so called ‘roaring twenties’. This was underlined by the circulation of free market capitalism, with the Federal Government interfering as little as possible. The government encouraged this as it always had before the First World War, and was summarised by Calvin Coolidge’s phrase, ‘The return to normalcy’. This would mean business went largely unregulated. Therefore a main reason for the Great Depression can be said to lie with the structure of American Economics, which links with the idea of consumerism on credit and the de-regulated banking system.

The growth of consumerism is something which greatly exacerbated the Great Depression because it enabled a growth of spending on domestic products, which coincided with an increase in productivity and wages. Gene Smiley comments that between 1923 and 1929, the income per person increased from $763 to $859 and earnings of employees rose by 15.7%. Manufacturing increased by 23.5% and productivity rose by 14% as new innovations, such as assembly line manufacturing were created.[11] The result was more employment and fewer hours for workers which meant more leisure time for employees. It also meant families could purchase domestic goods and services based on credit. New innovations such as the dish washer represented a new concept, of borrowing money to pay for goods and services that were not available before. The fact the rate of credit was relatively high compared to what Americans could afford, paved the way for an unstable financial system. This succeeded in encouraging the Great Depression as by 1930, American citizens found themselves in a state of crisis as their credit was recalled.

The effects of consumerism became magnified by America’s weak banking system, which imploded on itself when the depression happened. The vast majority of America’s banks were small self-sufficient institutions, which relied more on investment than commercial ventures. For example, New York’s banks formed a complex system of 57 branches, with more than twenty subsidiary real estate corporations, and an insurance company. When the Stock Market crashed in 1929, the panic caused wealthy holders to withdraw their money, generating a mass panic. Depositors rushed to withdraw money out of their banks, and banks closed if they did not have adequate reserves. Since the minimum capital requirement for banks was less than $25,000, banks found they were unable to pay and bankers to called in loans and sold assets, which meant credit froze up.[12] When credit froze up, less money was in circulation in the U.S. economy which led to deflation. The price of goods dropped and businesses had to cut costs by laying off workers. Because unemployed workers could not purchase goods any longer, inventories continued to build up and Americans could no longer borrow money to pay for these. The effect was immediately felt because as businesses went bankrupt, people no longer could afford services that would keep these businesses open by borrowing money.[13] The effects of this can be seen by the fact at the end of 1931, 20 Million workers were unemployed and 4,905 banks had closed. [14]

 

American Politics

The Presidency of Hoover can be seen as a key element as to why the Great Depression occurred, and why a lack of measures was taken to prevent it. Hoover has often been cited as an indecisive President who did little to help the American people. His general assumption had been that the Depression would sort itself out, and the role of government was to assist rather than interfere. For example, when the depression began Hoover managed to persuade major industrialists to maintain wage rates.[15] In 1932, he invested $140 million in public works such as the construction of the Hoover dam.[16] Overall, he doubled the Federal Public Works Expenditure to $700 Million. However, none of these measures were nearly enough to curb the effects of the depression. Hoover did not allow the Federal government to directly interfere in finance or welfare. Instead, he relied on business’ to stimulate the economy which is understandable because in 1929, federal expenditure only constituted 3% of the Federal GDP.[17] Until the New Deal, the United States Government had hardly ever interfered in domestic affairs. The question had never been ‘when’ the Federal Government would interfere but ‘if’ they would, and the orthodox political process had always favoured doing little. The closest to any sort of large scale assistance for example was the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which was financed to issue emergency loans but by this time the Great Depression was blindingly evident.

In Hoover’s memoirs, he puts the blame FOR the Great Depression on the First World War and this holds some validity. After the First World War the United States had sought to separate itself from the rest of the world, but paradoxically included itself in a web of economic debts which were caused by the War. Thus, President Hoover’s sentiments are understandable since America dominated world economics after the First World War (with the exception of the USSR). The First World War had caused the major European powers such as Britain, France and Germany, to borrow money to reconstruct their economies. It was hoped that by doing so, there would be a greater European importation of American goods, as would be the case during the Cold War. For example, American foreign trade globally jumped from $4.5 Billion in 1913 to $10.2 Billion by 1929.[18] Debt also played a large part in this policy, which had drastic consequences during the depression. Germany the defeated power, paid reparations to France and Britain through loans borrowed from America. Altogether, Germany had borrowed $1.28 billion in loans, and United States Bankers earned an estimated $50 million in net profit.[19] Britain and France borrowed an estimated $10 billion from the Federal bank, which was paid back through German debt.[20] When the Great Depression occurred, it meant the web of debts paid through American finance collapsed on itself.

America’s foreign policy during the Hoover administration therefore also plays a role because of its global repercussions. Hoover responded to the crises by cutting any possibility of international trade. For example the Hawley-Smoot tariff was enacted in 1930 and put the rate of American tariffs up to an all time high. The intention behind this was to protect American goods and workers, which would encourage foreign investors to purchase goods and invest in American domestic products once again.[21] However, the opposite effect occurred. European countries responded by raising their own tariffs and this meant there were fewer buyers to purchase American goods, less trade and less employment. Hoover also proposed a range of debt solutions, but this did not have a wide effect because central European bankers refused to let go of the gold standard (an economy measured in the amount of gold), which prevented governments from pumping necessary money into their economies. This is because financiers were more anxious about where their money was being invested; a solution paper based economies (such as Britain) would solve. When Britain abandoned the gold standard altogether in 1931, the U.S. government did not follow suit and this meant international trade froze. It resulted in Britain and its dominions, establishing an economic bloc of their own, which discriminated against non-empire producers and cancelled American orders.[22] The halting of international trade succeeded in causing more deflation which caused more economic stagnation. Thus, Hoover’s foreign prejudices and policies, though intending to preserve American economics, only succeeded in weakening it.

 

 

 

 

Outcomes

The Great Depression has been disputed, unclear and largely mythologized. However its effects have been plainly evident. The result of the Great Depression was intervention by the Federal Government in economic affairs by mass mobilising the work force. Internationally, its effects were greatly felt as nations increasingly strode to become self-sufficient to balance lack of trade.

New American Economics: The New Deal

The New Deal can be said to have had a long lasting effect on American Economics and society, and ushered in a new way in which the ideas of American security and freedom would be interpreted. It was headed by Hoover’s successor Franklin D. Roosevelt, whose ideas of fixing the economy came from Keynesian economics (which adopted the idea of borrowing money and going into large deficit, to circulate money into the economy). This would fund mass projects for conservation and infrastructure, which intended to give 20 million unemployed American workers jobs.[23] More importantly, the New Deal attempted to use government programmes to prevent a future Great Depression.

When analysing the New Deal, it is important to split it into three aspects: relief, recovery and reform. Relief would give welfare to the unemployed in the form of handouts; recovery intended to fix the economy in the short run and reform would regulate the economy for long term prosperity. These categories were important because they worked in accordance with the state of the Great Depression. For example in 1933, Roosevelt ended prohibition which provided a viable source of income for starting The New Deal and would help to relieve southern farmers, who could sell their crops for higher prices.[24] This largely was to provide finance for relief. Also, the boundaries are often blurred in some cases and categories would often overlap with each other. The Emergency Banking Act for example ended a month long series of runs on the banks, by preventing gold hoarding and exchanged gold bullion for paper dollar notes. This meant after the banks were opened, confidence in the banks was restored and eager citizens lined up to deposit their money. The act also resulted in the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which guaranteed future deposits against future disasters.[25] In this case, the Emergency Banking act emphasised relief, recovery and reform.

 

The First New Deal

Roosevelt’s policies before 1935 have been quoted by most American Historians as the First new Deal, which primarily focused on relief and recovery. These would introduce programmes which intended to extend the powers of the Federal government. For example, congress passed laws establishing the civilian conservation core, which employed young people to build national parks and maintain by building forests.[26] The Glass- Steagall Act of 1932, prevented commercial banks from buying and selling stock and separated financial and commercial banking.[27] Most importantly, the National Industrial Recovery Act was passed, which established the National Industrial Recovery Administration. It was designed for government planners and business leaders to work together, to co-ordinate industry standards for production, prices and working conditions.[28]

The problems with many of these acts were that they did not provide immediate help to the starving and unemployed worker. Therefore attention was turned to immediate relief. The Federal Relief Emergency Administration provided $500 million in grant aid to states, who would give welfare payments to the unemployed in desperate conditions. One section of the National industrial Recovery Agency created the Public Works Administration, which appropriated $33 Billion to build projects such as the Triborough Bridge in New York.[29] Also, the Civil Works administration was created, which employed 4 Million people and operated through work and construction projects directly. By December 14th 1933, there were 2,610,451 workers employed and by the middle of January, this had more than doubled with 400,000 projects.[30]

In agriculture, a similar strategy was adopted with the intent of bettering life for Southern farmers. For example, the Tennessee Valley Authority built a series of dams in the Tennessee River valley, to control flooding, prevent deforestation and provide electricity to rural communities in several Southern states. However, the act was controversial because it put government in direct competition with private companies.[31] A similar case became apparent with the Agricultural Adjustment Act, which gave the government power to raise farm prices by setting production quotas and paying farmers to produce less food. The result was a reduction of all food types and 6 million pigs were slaughtered to balance supply and demand.[32] Unlike other acts passed by Roosevelt, the policies on agriculture produced mixed results. The fact that responsibility for agriculture was delegated, meant provincial level officials often determined distribution and these applied racially. Only property farmers saw the benefits of the AAA and African Americans who were tenants or sharecroppers, continued to live the same conditions as before.[33]

 

The Supreme Court and the Second New Deal

Judicially, the New Deal created problems for the Supreme Court. In 1935, the Supreme Court invalidated the National Industrial Recovery Administration because it delegated legislative powers to the President and attempted to regulate business. Roosevelt responded by announcing a new law, which would allow him to appoint new Supreme Court justices if they reached the age of 70 and failed to retire. However, this caused a huge backlash from the American public and opponents of the plan enjoyed widespread support.[34] The Result was a compromise between the President and the Supreme Court, whereby government regulation of the economy was allowed under a very broad reading of Supreme Court jurisprudence. Thus, the conflict between Roosevelt and the Supreme Court signalled the Second New Deal.

The Second New Deal primarily focused on Reform and economic security, and these were determined both by the National Labour Relations Act (the Wagner Act) and the Social Security Act. These represented a transformation in the relationship between the Federal Government and American citizens. The Wagner act guaranteed workers the right to unionise and created a national labour relations board, to hear disputes over unfair labour practices. Projects such as the Congress of Industrial Organisations set out to unionise all forms of industry and by 1939union membership rose to 9 million.[35] The Social Security act subsidised people with unemployment insurance, aid to poor families and children and retirement benefits. It was funded through payroll taxes, though local governments held a discretion over how benefits would be distributed.[36] The idea of these was to provide security, so American workers would spend their money on consumer goods rather than services.

 

International Reverberations

The Great Depression would have a drastic international effect. Though America had attempted to isolate itself from the rest of the world during the interwar period, its economic and cultural influence succeeded in spreading to Western Europe after the First World War. This meant when the Great Depression did hit it had an instrumental effects on the global economy, with the exception of the USSR which had attempted to make itself self-sufficient. In Western Europe since most debts were paid with American credit, the system of borrowing collapsed. In 1929, the Depression had a monumental effect on German industry which crashed and between 1929 and 1932, unemployment rose from 8.5% to 29.9%.[37] In Britain, unemployment had risen to 2.5 million by the end of 1930, and exports had fallen by 50%, which had resulted in very drastic cuts to restore confidence in the pound.[38] The Japanese economy had shrunk by 8% from 1929 to 1930 and like America, had decided to implement Keynesian economics to stop deflation.[39] The similarity in these cases shows a decrease of trade and an increasing emphasis on internal affairs. The outcome of the Great Depression would have an effect on shifting emphasis, from international trade to self-sufficiency.

The transition to self-sufficiency would also have long term political effects, especially with the rise of extreme right wing and ultra-nationalist parties. The phenomenon was felt by many countries to be caused by the view that liberal democracies and capitalism had failed. Though Japan had effectively used Keynesian economics to restore its economy, the depression had caused a rise in militarism which saw appeasement to the Western world as decadent. Following a series of military coups up to 1936, Japan became increasingly militaristic and sought to expand in order to sustain its economy, which was signalled by a shortage in material goods. Imperialistically, it attempted to attain an Eastern Asia co-prosperity sphere by uniting all Eastern Asians into one rule, as well as become a major global power. In 1931, Japan invaded and annexed Manchuria and in 1937 invaded China, an occupation which only ended after the Second World War.[40]

The outcome of the Depression had been a growth of right wing national parties, as well as new empires which were determined to replace the older European ones. In 1933 the National Socialist Party under Adolf Hitler was democratically elected. It established a Racialist state that attempted to make Germany a self-sufficient global superpower. In a series of centralised economic policies, he established similar projects to those under the Hoover administration but made these compulsory by the enabling act. He sanctioned mass projects, such as the construction of the Autobahns and agricultural projects to build forests. This had also mass industrialised German industry by co-operating with major industrial companies such as the Krupp works, by re-arming and mass-mobilising German industry. By 1939, military spending was more than 10% of Germany’s GDP.[41] However, this had massively decreased consumerism and meant Germany became increasingly dependent on European imports. From 1933 to 1935 imports rose by 9%, which came from Central and Eastern European neighbours and also meant Germany increasingly had influence over these nations after the Great Depression.[42] By 1937, all Eastern and Central European Countries (with the exception of Czechoslovakia) based themselves on the fascist economic framework (such as corporatism), and large industrial companies mainly exported to Germany.[43] This became finalised during the Second World War, which also coincided with the ‘hunger plan’, which would use large parts of the USSR as farming land to make up for inefficient sectors of German Farming.[44]

Most importantly, the Great Depression was one of the main causes for the Second World War. In 1940, Germany, Italy and Japan signed the Pact of steel that made the axis, whose aims were to break the Capitalist powers of the West and Communism. Hitler’s idea of Lebensraum had caused Germany to re-arm itself and invade Poland in 1939. By 1941, Germany controlled a continental Empire which stretched from France, to the USSR, to Greece. This coincided with Mussolini’s visions of a modern Roman Empire, which caused him to invade Greece and British controlled Egypt. Japan was at war with China by the start of the Second World War but due to American embargo on Japanese oil, the Imperial Japanese navy attacked the American Naval base at Pearl Harbour in 1941. The attack drew America into a global war, and formally allied itself with Great Britain. Ironically, the large mobilisation of American society, effectively recovered the United States economy from Depression. By 1944, the American economy was in overdrive and the Federal Government had taken control over key industries. During the war, America’s GDP had increased by 60% from $91 billion to $214 Billion.[45]

 

Conclusion

The Great Depression had a profound effect on American society. It was caused by the growth of consumer culture on credit, and the precariousness of de-regularised American banks. However, the definition of the ‘Great Depression’ is debatable. For American farmers, the Great Depression happened after the First World War, due to overproduction. Also, a lack of intervention by the Federal Government, during the Hoover administration, meant the Great Depression began to have long term effects. This encompassed assistance rather than interference which did little to help the millions of unemployed Americans. Due to America’s economic dominance after the First World War, the cycle of loans that were given to European nations to recover became exacerbated. The outcome of the depression was greater government intervention, which attempted to regulate the economy and apply Keynesian economics. However, the Great Depression also caused nations to look to them in order to be self-sufficient. This helped the rise of right wing authoritarian regimes, which contributed largely to the Second World War, which would eventually involve the United States and cause the Great Depression to end.

 

 

 

[1] Harold Bierman, Jr, The Great Myths of 1929 and the Lessons to be Learned (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 5.

[2] Robert Sobel, The Great Bull Market: Wall Street in the 1920s (New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc, 1968), p. 74.

[3] p. 135.

[4] Gene Smiley, Rethinking the Great Depression (Chicago: R. Dee Publisher, 2002), p. 11.

[5] Hugh Brogan, The Penguin History of the USA (London: Penguin Books, 1999), p. 510.

[6] Robert Sobel, Panic on Wall Street: A History of America’s Financial Disasters (Washington, D.C.: Beard Books, 1999), p. 351.

[7] Michael E. Parrish, Anxious Decades: America in Prosperity and Depression, 1920-1941 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company), pp. 405- 421.

[8] Grant McConnell, the Decline of Agrarian Democracy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1953), p. 25.

[9] Michael E. Parrish, Anxious Decades, pp. 83-84.

[10] Ibid, p. 82.

[11] Gene Smiley, Rethinking the Great ‘Depression. p. 4.

[12] Susan Estabrook Kennedy, The Banking Crisis of 1933 (Louisville: University Press of Kentucky, 1973), p. 1.

[13] Ibid, p. 6.

[14] Wyn Derbishire, Dark Realities: America’s Great Depression (London: Spiramus Press, 2013), p. 95.

[15] Paul D. Moreno, The American from the Civil War to the New Deal: The Twilight of Constitutionalism and the Triumph of Progressivism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013) p. 213.

[16] Vincent H. Gaddis, Herbert Hoover, Unemployment, and the Public Sphere: A Conceptual History 1919-1933 (Oxford: University Press of America, 2005) p. 122.

[17] Bill Jenkins & Edward C. Page, The Foundations of Bureaucracy in Economic and Social Thought (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2004) p. 57.

[18] Frank Costigliola, Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919-1933 (London: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 142.

[19] Ibid, p. 146.

[20] Gerald Hardach, The First World War, 1914-1918 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press),   p. 290.

[21] Joan Hoff Wilson, American Business & Foreign Policy: 1920- 1933 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), pp. 96- 97.

[22] Frank Costigliola, Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919-1933, pp. 243- 244.

[23] William E. Leuchtenburg, The New Deal: A Documentary History (Columbia, S.C: University of South Carolina Press, 1969), p. XV.

[24] Anthony J. Badger, The New Deal: The Depression Years, 1933-40 (London: MACMILLAN EDUCATION LTD, 1989), p. 59.

[25] Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr, The Age of Roosevelt: The Coming of the New Deal (Massachusetts, Cambridge: The Riberside Press, 1959), pp. 7, 443.

[26] Anthony J. Badger, The Depression Years, 1933-40, p. 170.

[27] Helen M. Burns, The American Banking Community and The New Deal Banking Reforms, 1933-1935 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1974), p. 16.

[28] Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt: The Coming of the New Deal, p. 99.

[29] Ibid, p. 264.

[30] Ibid, P. 270.

[31] Ibid, pp. 327-333

[32] Ibid, p. 146

[33] Kimberly L. Phillips, Daily Life During African American Migrations (California, Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2012), p. 107

[34] William E. Leutchtenburg, Frankin D. Roosevelt’s Supreme Court “Packing” Plan” in Essays on the New Deal, ed. By Harold M. Hollingsworth and William F. Holes (Texas, Arlington: University of Texas Press), pp. 69-76.

[35] Robert H. Zieger , Gilbert J. Gall, American Workers, American Unions: The Twentieth Century (Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press, 2002), p. 66

[36] Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt: The Coming of the New Deal, p. 313.

[37] Bernd Widdig, Culture and Inflation in Weimar Germany (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001), p. 223.

[38] Frank Trentmanm, Free Trade Nations: Commerce, Consumption and Civil Society in Modern Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 333.

[39] Francisco E. Gonzalez, Creative Destruction?: Economic Crisis and Democracy in Latin America (Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press, 2012). p. 214

[40] Janis Mimura, Planning for Empire: Reform, Bureaucrats and the Japanese Wartime State (New York: Cornell University Press, 2011).

[41] Has-Joachim Braun, The German Economy in the Twentieth Century (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 85.

[42] William Carr, Arms, Autarky and Aggression (London: Edward Arnold, 1972), p. 53.

[43] Bernd Jurgen Fischer, Balkan Strongmen: Dictators and Authoritarian Rulers in Southeast Europe, ed. By Bernd JUrgen Fischer (London: C. Hurst and Co, 2007).

[44] Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (London: Penguin Books, 2007), pp. 538-549.

[45] N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics (Stamford, Connecticut: Cengage Learning, 2009), p. 766.

 

 

 

Bibliography

 

Books

Bierman Jr, Harold, The Great Myths of 1929 and the Lessons to be Learned (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991)

Braun, Has-Joachim, The German Economy in the Twentieth Century (London: Routledge, 1990)

Brogan, Hugh, The Penguin History of the USA (London: Penguin Books, 1999)

Carr, William, Arms, Autarky and Aggression (London: Edward Arnold, 1972)

Costigliola, Frank, Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919-1933 (London: Cornell University Press, 1984)

Derbishire, Wyn, Dark Realities: America’s Great Depression (London: Spiramus Press, 2013)

D. Moreno, Paul, The American from the Civil War to the New Deal: The Twilight of Constitutionalism and the Triumph of Progressivism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013)

E. Leuchtenburg, William, The New Deal: A Documentary History (Columbia, S.C: University of South Carolina Press, 1969)

E. Parrish, Michael, Anxious Decades: America in Prosperity and Depression, 1920-1941 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company)

Estabrook Kennedy, Susan, The Banking Crisis of 1933 (Louisville: University Press of Kentucky, 1973)

E. Gonzalez, Francisco, Creative Destruction?: Economic Crisis and Democracy in Latin America (Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press, 2012)

Hardach, Gerald, The First World War, 1914-1918 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press)

H. Gaddis, Vincent, Herbert Hoover, Unemployment, and the Public Sphere: A Conceptual History 1919-1933 (Oxford: University Press of America, 2005)

Hoff Wilson, Joan, American Business & Foreign Policy: 1920- 1933 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971)

H. Zieger, Robert, Gilbert J. Gall, American Workers, American Unions: The Twentieth Century (Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press, 2002)

J. Badger, Anthony, The New Deal: The Depression Years, 1933-40 (London: MACMILLAN EDUCATION LTD, 1989), p. 59.

Jenkins, Bill & C. Page, Edward, The Foundations of Bureaucracy in Economic and Social Thought (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2004)

Jurgen Fischer, Bernd, Balkan Strongmen: Dictators and Authoritarian Rulers in Southeast Europe (London: C. Hurst and Co, 2007)

L. Phillips, Kimberly, Daily Life During African American Migrations (California, Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2012)

Mankiw, N. Gregory, Principles of Economics (Stamford, Connecticut: Cengage Learning, 2009)

McConnell, Grant, the Decline of Agrarian Democracy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1953)

M. Burns, Helen, The American Banking Community and The New Deal Banking Reforms, 1933-1935 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1974)

Mimura, Janis, Planning for Empire: Reform, Bureaucrats and the Japanese Wartime State (New York: Cornell University Press, 2011)

M. Schlesinger Jr, Arthur, The Age of Roosevelt: The Coming of the New Deal (Massachusetts, Cambridge: The Riberside Press, 1959)

Smiley, Gene, Rethinking the Great Depression (Chicago: R. Dee Publisher, 2002)

Sobel, Robert, Panic on Wall Street: A History of America’s Financial Disasters (Washington, D.C.: Beard Books, 1999)

Sobel, Robert, The Great Bull Market: Wall Street in the 1920s (New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc, 1968),

Tooze, Adam, The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (London: Penguin Books, 2007)

Trentmanm, Frank, Free Trade Nations: Commerce, Consumption and Civil Society in Modern Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008)

Widdig, Bernd, Culture and Inflation in Weimar Germany (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001)

 

Articles and chapters

E. Leutchtenburg, William, Frankin D. Roosevelt’s Supreme Court “Packing” Plan” in Harold M. Hollingsworth, eds, and William F. Holes Essays on the New Deal (Texas, Arlington: University of Texas Press), pp. 69-76.

 

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